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De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc.: "Minimum
Contacts" and "National Contacts" as Bases for
In Personam Jurisdiction in Admiralty
Claims
In the 1981 admiralty case of DeJames v. Magnicence Carriers,Inc. ,t
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether,
under recent Supreme Court decisions, a New Jersey federal district
court could secure jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation under either
the state's long-arm statute or a national contacts theory of federal jurisdiction. The court failed to find the requisite "minimum contacts" '2 or
"reasonable anticipation ' 3 on which to base personal jurisdiction over
the defendant Japanese corporation 4 and likewise, on the facts of the
case, failed to accept the application of a national contacts test to supply
a basis for personal jurisdiction.5
Joseph De James, a citizen of New Jersey, allegedly suffered personal injuries while working aboard the vessel M. V Magnificence Venture,
then moored at a pier in Camden, New Jersey. The plaintiff alleged his
injuries were directly caused by defective work performed by Hitachi
Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd. (hereinafter Hitachi) of Japan
in converting the M. V Magnifience Venture into an automobile carrier.
Under the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333, the plaintiff sought to recover damages.
At the district court level, defendant Hitachi moved to dismiss the
complaint for insufficient service of process and for lack of in personam
jurisdiction. Hitachi supported its motion with an affidavit stating that
all work performed on the M. V Magnificence Venture was done at its shipyards in Osaka, Japan, and that Hitachi conducted no business in the
state of New Jersey. 6 Plaintiff responded by arguing that Hitachi's conI De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F.Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 654
F.2d 280 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981).
2 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (landmark case which first
applied the "minimum contacts" test for in personam jurisdiction).
3 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (plaintiff purchased

an automobile from a New York dealer and suffered personal injuries in an accident in
Oklahoma. Held, that Oklahoma had no jurisdiction over the dealer merely because plaintiff's
use of the car outside of New York was foreseeable. It must be "reasonably anticipated" that

the defendant be subject to suit in the state).
4 654 F.2d at 284-86.
5 Id. at 286-90.
6 491 F.Supp. at 1277-78.
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tacts with New Jersey were adequate for jurisdictional purposes, and that
Hitachi's aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole could be
considered in determining jurisdiction since it was being sued on a federal claim. 7 The court held in favor of defendant Hitachi on both issues,
and granted the motion for dismissal.8
On appeal to the Third Circuit, De James argued that the district
court erred in failing to find that Hitachi's contact with New Jersey was
sufficient to satisfy due process under the New Jersey long-arm statute
and, in the alternative, that the district court erred in failing to aggregate
Hitachi's contacts with the United States as a whole. 9 In arguing that
the one contact of Hitachi with New Jersey (the docking of the converted
vessel in a New Jersey port) was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
"minimum contacts," De James relied heavily on the "stream-of-commerce" theory as a basis for jurisdiction.10 Because the conversion work
in effect made Hitachi the manufacturer of the vessel, under the stream
of commerce theory, it was argued that Hitachi should be subject to process in any port where the ship docked and the allegedly defective product caused injury. "
At the appellate level the plaintiff argued for the first time that service of process had been effected by wholly federal means such that the
court should have aggregated all of Hitachi's contacts with the United
States to support jurisdiction.' 2 Plaintiff noted that he had served process on the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in compliance with the
Convention on Service Abroad ofJudict'al and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and
Commercial Matters.' 3 Although the district court had not been made
'aware that service was made pursuant to the Convention on Service
Abroad, the court of appeals recognized that plaintiff had presented the
national contacts theory below and, absent objection from Hitachi,
4
found it proper to consider the argument.'
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of the applicable law
to determine if personal jurisdiction could be obtained over Hitachi in an
admiralty case. The court noted that although the instant case was not a
diversity case, the principles of due process announced in diversity cases
such as InternationalShoe and its progeny are "also applicable to nondiversity cases."' 5 Specifically, in dealing with the plaintiff's allegations that
Hitachi had sufficient contacts with New Jersey to satisfy its long-arm
7 Id. at 1278.

8 Id. at 1284.
9 654 F.2d at 283.
10 Id.

II Id. at 285.
12 Id. at 283.

13 654 F.2d at 283. Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, [hereinafter

cited as Convention on Service Abroad].
14 654 F.2d at 287.
15 Id. at 283.
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statute,16 the court stated it was bound by the due process constraints of
17
the fourteenth amendment.
Based primarily on World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,8 the most recent Supreme Court decision on due process requirements for long-arm
jurisdiction, the Third Circuit found that the single fortuitous contact of
the Magnificence Venture docking in New Jersey was insufficient contact on
which to base jurisdiction.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the plaintiff purchased an automobile
from a New York dealer and then suffered personal injuries in an accident in Oklahoma allegedly caused by defects in the auto. In refusing to
find the New York dealer subject to Oklahoma's jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court indicated that due process requires a potential defendant
to have engaged in conduct such that he has a reasonable expectation
that he may be "haled into court" in the forum state.' 9 The Court found
that absent other factors, the possibility that a product might find its way
into the forum state, or that the defendant could foresee that its product
might affect the forum state would not constitute sufficient facts to sup20
port the "reasonable expectation" standard.
The court of appeals specifically rejected the plaintiff's "stream-ofcommerce" argument, stating that his reliance on Stabihsierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Wine DistributorsPy. Ltd 21 and Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd v.
Hollingsworth22 was misplaced. 23 In examining the "stream-of-commerce" theory, the court of appeals noted its use as a means of sustaining
16 Id. at 284.
17 Id. at 284. The court noted the anomaly of a federal court in a nondiversity case (admiralty in De-James) being limited by the fourteenth amendment's due process restrictions imposed on the states, rather than the fifth amendment restrictions imposed on the federal

government. The court felt compelled to find this result as Congress has not authorized national service of process in admiralty claims and thus a plaintiff is forced to utilize state longarm statutes. Id. Judge Gibbons in dissent argues that the court need only consider fifth
amendment limits in federal question cases as for a federal claim the party's rights and liabilities
should be determined under uniform, national law. Id. at 292. The significant difference in
applying only fifth amendment requirements according to Judge Gibbons, is that a defendant's
national contacts enter into the determination of fundamental fairness, rather than the defendant's contacts with only the forum state. Id.
18 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
19 Id. at 297.
20 Id. at 295.
21 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In this case, German wine producers brought a trade-

mark infringement action against an Australian wine producer and others. The court of appeals held the Australian wine producer subject to personal jurisdiction under the District of
Columbia long-arm statute, which permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the limits of Due Process. The court found that the Australian wine producer's activities of "ship[ping] goods to an
intermediary with the expectation that (they] will distribute the goods in a region that includes

the District of Columbia," was transacting business within the District of Columbia. Id. at 205.
Furthermore, the court noted that the Australian wine producer had granted an exclusive distributorship which included the District of Columbia, making "sales of their wine here not
merely foreseeable, but affirmatively welcomed." Id.
22 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). Duple Motor Bodies was a product liability action against
an English manufacturer of coach bodies for injuries suffered in Hawaii. The court held that
under the Hawaii long-arm statute the sale of a negligently manufactured coach to a distributor
with knowledge that it was to be used in Hawaii was adequate to support jurisdiction. The
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jurisdiction in product liability cases involving an extensive chain of distribution. 24 Based on the assumption that due process does not allow a
manufacturer to insulate itself from "long-arm" jurisdiction by the use of
middle-men or by keeping itself ignorant of its product's ultimate destination, courts have found that the indirect benefit which accrues to the
manufacturer by virtue of eventual sales in the forum state is adequate to
meet due process requirements.
The court of appeals distinguished Hitachi from the manufacturers
in the stream-of-commerce cases on the grounds that Hitachi did not use
the owners of the vessel on which it performed conversion work ("manufactured") as distributors in a marketing scheme. 25 Any indirect benefit
- such as an increased market for converted ships because of the existence of a port in New Jersey at which such ships could dock - was found
to be too attenuated to support jurisdiction. The court compared this
indirect benefit to the derivative benefit enjoyed by the local automobile
dealer in World-Wide Volkswagen, and noted that the benefit in that case
26
was also sufficient.
The court of appeals also rejected plaintiff's argument that the New
Jersey court should have jurisdiction over Hitachi because it was foreseeable that a vessel the size of an automobile carrier could travel to, and
dock at, any port in the world, including Camden, New Jersey. 27 It
found that the nature of Hitachi's conduct (conversion work performed
entirely in Japan) did not put the defendant on notice that it might be
called into court in New Jersey. Therefore, while a single contact with
the forum state may be adequate to support jurisdiction if the suit results
from that contact, 28 "forseeability alone" is not sufficient to support jurisdiction. 29 To accept plaintiff's foreseeability argument would be to
subject Hitachi to the threat of defending a suit wherever a ship on
which it had worked happened to travel. The majority in Dejames felt
such a result had been found unacceptable by the Supreme Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen. 30
Judge Gibbons, in dissent, argued that the majority's comparison of
Hitachi to the local automobile dealer in World-Wide Volkswagen was "off
court noted that special modifications had been made by the defendant manufacturer so that
the coaches would be more suitable for use in Hawaii. Id. at 234.
23 654 F.2d at 285-86.
24 Id. at 285.
25 Id.
26
27
28

Id.
Id. at 286.
Id.

29 654 F.2d at 286, citing 444 U.S. at 295-97.
30 444 U.S. at 295-97. The Circuit Court noted that it was foreseeable that the ship converted by Hitachi could transport cars to any port in the world. The fortuitous circumstance
that the owner of the ship chose to dock in New Jersey was bound to be insufficient to support
jurisdiction over Hitachi under the New Jersey long-arm statute as the fortuitous circumstance
that the owner of the Volkswagen drove through Oklahoma was insufficient to support jurisdiction over a New York automobile dealer. 654 F.2d at 286.
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the mark. '' I Gibbons viewed World-Wide Volkswagen as reaffirming "the
principle that a manufacturer who injects a product into the stream of
interstate commerce may be subject to personal jurisdiction in the state
where the product causes harm."' 32 The dissent noted the Supreme
Court's reaffirmation of the stream-of-commerce line of cases and its "approving reference ' ':33 to Gray . American Radiator and Standard Saniary
Corp. 34 Gray, a stream-of-commerce case, held that an Illinos court had
jurisdiction over Titan Valve Manufacturing Co., a foreign corporation,
because a valve it manufactured as a component part of radiators allegedly caused injury to an Illinois citizen, within that state) 5' Citing the
changing nature of commercial activity 3" (increased specialization and
interdependent marketing), Gray found that the manufacture and sale of
valves to be used in interstate commerce satisfied the InternationalShoe
37
tests of minimum contacts and fairness.
The dissent in Dejames distinguished Hitachi from the local automobile dealer in World-Wide Volkswagen on the grounds that Hitachi was
not the end of the distributive scheme, but "an integral part of international commerce in Japanese automobiles.":"
The dissent viewed
Hitachi as being similar to Titan Valve in Gray because Hitachi benefitted "by selling its vessels to shipowners who will take them to New Jersey
ports." 39 The dissent further noted that because of the size of the New
Jersey ports it was "not 'merely foreseeable', but virtually inevitable that
' 40
ships Hitachi converts will dock in New Jersey.
The dissent's discussion of Gray appears to be substantially on point
with the factual situation of Dejames. For the court to accept the reasoning and result of Gray, however, the majority would have had to extend
and expand Gray in two sigificant areas. First, the court would have had
to expand the concept of "indirect benefits" to include the profits made
by a supplier of a means of distribution. These profits differ from those
enjoyed by the manufacturer of a component part in that they are generated through the establishment of a chain of distribution, not through
the actual distribution of products. This type of profit is much more
indirect than that enjoyed by Titan Valve in Gray and an expansion of
"indirect benefit" to include Hitachi's profits from automobile carrier
conversion would seem to substantially broaden the term.
A second problem in applying Gray is that the generally accepted
concept of a chain of distribution would have to be expanded in terms of
31 Id. at 290.
32

Id.

33 Id.

34 22 Il.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
35 444 U.S. at 297-98.
36 22 Il.2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
37 Id.

38 654 F.2d at 291.
39 Id.

40 Id.
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number of links and as to what constitutes a "link." Hitachi, as a supplier of a means of distribution, represents a "link" not present in Gray or
other stream-of-commerce cases. Furthermore, absent any evidence in
the record that the Magnificence Venture sailed directly to Camden, New
Jersey, or that Camden was an established port in the "distributive
scheme" used by Japanese automobile manufacturers, the court would
have had to include any ultimate destination as being within the chain of
distribution. The court of appeals' refusal to expand Gray keeps the De
James holding well within the framework which merited an "approving
reference" by the Supreme Court.
The appellant argued, as an alternative to his claim that Hitachi's
contact with New Jersey alone was adequate to support jurisdiction, that
the service of process made on the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
under the Convention on Service Abroad was by a "wholly federal
means" such that the national contacts theory should be applied under
the reasoning in the district court opinion. 4' The court of appeals accepted, with reservations 42 and only for the purpose of the Dejames ap-3
peal, the district court's dicta regarding the national contacts test.4
However, based on the "legislative history, language, and purpose of the
treaty,"' 44 the court held that the Convention on Service Abroad did not
provide the authority for serving process on a foreign defendant required
45
by Federal Rule 4(e) or 4(i).
Professor Thomas F. Green, Jr. laid the foundation for the "national
contacts test" in his article, FederalJurisditionin Personam of Corporationsand
Due Process.46 His thorough dissection of Federal Rule 4 in relation to
Erie R.R. v. Tompkis 4 7 Pennoyer v. Neff,48 and the InternationalShoe line of
cases led him to conclude that the due process clause of either the fifth or
the fourteenth amendments would not serve to limit the jurisdiction of a
federal court with proper venue if the corporation had sufficient contacts
with the United States. Professor Green reasoned that, "[i]f either subdivision (3) or (7) of division (9) of rule 4 is complied with and the other
provisions of rule 4 are satisfied, no significance. . . should attach to the
'49
thin veil of state lines."
Professor Green's theory was accepted by a federal district court in
First F'ght Co. v. National Carloading Corp. 50 As pointed out by the court
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286 n.3.
43 Id. at 286. The district court held that if service of process could be made by wholly
federal means, all of the defendant's contacts with the U.S. could be aggregated to meet a
41

42

"national contacts test" and support jurisdiction.
44 Id. at 290.
45 Id.

46 Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand. L.
Rev. 967 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Green].
47 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

48 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
49 Green, supra note 48, at 986.
50 209 F.Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn.

1962).
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in De James, First F'ght advanced the theory that in a cause of action
arising under federal law, the restrictions which the fourteenth amendment places upon-state jurisdiction are not applicable. Therefore, the
due process clause of the fifth amendment controls, and aggregated national contacts may then be used to meet the general standard of "fairness" required by the fifth amendment.5 t The policy reasons behind the
adoption of a national contacts approach included the minimal relative
inconvenience of an alien corporation defending a suit in one state in the
United States as opposed to another, and the desirability of providing a
forum for plaintiffs injured by corporations with de minimus contacts
52
with various states in the United States.
First Flight's acceptance of Professor Green's national contacts theory clouded the limits of jurisdiction for federal claims and was cautiously noted in two cases the following year, more on the grounds of
being confusing than controlling. 53 First Flight was severely criticized in
the 1965 decision of Scott v. Mid Eastern Airlhnes Co., S.A. 54 which specifically rejected national contacts as grounds for jurisdiction over an admiralty case brought under the Federal Death on the High Seas Act5 5 on
the grounds that "given the array of precedents in this case, the Court
can not take it upon itself to change the law as did Judge Wilson in the
'56
First Flight case - no mean feat for a district judge.
The district court in Dejames noted that the national contacts theory had been rejected by the majority of cases in which it had been
presented where there was no statute which provided for nationwide
service of process for the federal claim. 57 However, a national contacts
test has been applied in cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act
of 193458 and the Securities Act of 193359 which allow for nationwide
service of process. Where national service of process is unavailable, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2) limits jurisdiction of the federal
courts by requiring that service of process be made pursuant to the forum
state's long-arm statute or other rules "under the circumstances and in
the manner prescribed in the statute or rule." Thus a federal court must
look to the forum state in determining whether it has jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant. 6°
The Dejames court's decision not to apply the national contacts test
51 491 F.Supp. at 1281.
52 Id. at 1281-82.
53 Chavan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, 217 F.Supp. 808 (E. D. Mich.

1963); Weinberg v. Colonial Williamsburg, Inc., 215 F.Supp. 633 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
54 240 F.Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
55 Pub. L. No. 165, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§761-768 (1976)).
56 240 F.Supp. at 4.
57 491 F.Supp. at 1282.
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Oxford First Corp v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F.Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F.Supp.
909 (D. Md. 1971).
60 491 F.Supp. at 1283.
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was foreshadowed in Edwardj. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber
Co. 61 In examining the question of defendant's minimum contacts in a
claim brought under the Sherman Act the court found that the "appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where the suit is based on a
federally created right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United States so as to satisfy the due process requirements
under the Fifth Amendment. '62 The court held, however, that such an
inquiry was not possible because neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court had provided for substituted service on alien corporations with
minimal contacts with the United States. This left as a barrier the requirement of Federal Rule 4(e)(2) that service made pursuant to a state
long-arm statute be made "under the circumstances and in the manner
'63
prescribed in the statute."
Two more recent cases brought under the Death on the High Seas
Act, which were not cited by the court, have applied the national contacts test in determining jurisdiction. In 1973, the case of Holt v. Klosters
Reder'A/S 64 held that a federal court in Michigan had jurisdiction over a
Norwegian corporation on the basis that tht: "defendant's contacts with
the United States, both qualitatively and quantitatively, are constitutionally sufficient to enable this court to render a binding judgment
against it."' 6 5 In 1980, Fosen v. United Technologies Corp.66 noted the controversy still surrounding the issue, but held that "federal jurisdictional
principles govern this in personam admiralty action, and thus the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction must be established with the
67
United States and not necessarily with the state of New York."
The court of appeals did not re-examine the merits of the "national
contacts test," but having accepted the district court's dicta that such a
test could be used if service of process was made by wholly federal means,
moved directly to an analysis of the Convention on Service Abroad to
determine if it constituted such a wholly federal means. 68 Prior to the
ratification of the treaty, significant problems existed with international
judicial assistance for service of process primarily due to inconsistent procedural requirements of the various nations. 69 The problem of inconsistency was further complicated in the United States because of the
existence of a separate procedural jurisdiction in each state and the District of Columbia. 7° The court of appeals found that it was this problem
of inconsistency and not a lack of authority which the Convention sought
289 F.Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
Id. at 390.
Id.
64 355 F.Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
65 Id. at 358.
66 484 F.Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
67 Id. at 498.
68 654 F.2d at 286-87.
69 Id. at 287.
70 Commission on International Rule of Judicial Procedure, S. Rep. No. 2392, 85th Cong.,
61
62
63
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to solve. The Third Circuit held7 that the purpose of the Convention is
clearly set forth in its preamble: '
The States signatory to the present Convention, Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to
be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time, Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial
assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed
72
upon the following provisions ....

There is no reference to creating additional authorization of jurisdiction
either in the preamble or in the text of the convention.
The Convention on Service Abroad seeks to provide a method of
securing judicial assistance which is consistent throughout the nations
which are a party to it by providing that each participant designate a
Central Authority to process requests for service. 73 Service may still be
made, however, without relying on the Convention so long as the nation
74
which is receiving service does not object to the method used.
Appellant sought to base jurisdiction on an application of the Convention in combination with Federal Rules 4(d)(3), 4(e) or 4(i). 75 Rule
4(d)(3) states that personal service may be made "by delivering a copy of
the summons to ... any other agent authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service of process" when such agent can be found within the
forum. Only the United States Marshall's Office handled a copy of the
complaint in New Jersey, and under the terms of the Convention, that
office "merely transmits" to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs a
request for service. 76 Actual service of process took place in Japan, not
within New Jersey, thus77 the court found that De James' reliance on rule
4(d)(3) was misplaced.
Under Federal Rule 4(e) or 4(i) valid service can be made only
when there exists a method for effecting such service and a federal or
state statute which authorizes it. Appellant argued that the Convention
on Service Abroad provided such authorization. 78 The court rejected
2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 5201, 5206. The Commission
noted in 1958 that:
The problem is procedural.... It relates principally to the recognition by courts
here and abroad of the service of process in foreign jurisdictions, proof of foreign
laws, public and private documents, and the introduction of testimony taken
abroad by way of depositions or letters rogatory. Existing means for servingjudicial documents abroad, securing records or examining witnesses in a foreign territory have been found to be cumbersome and insufficient. Lawyers have
discovered this in many parts of the world. It is all but impossible to serve a
paper without costly intervention of a foreign attorney.Id.
71 654 F.2d at 288.
72 Convention on Service Abroad, supra note 13, 20 U.S.T. at 362.
73 654 F.2d at 288.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 286-90.
76

Id. at 287.

77
78

Id.
Id. at 289-90.
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this argument on the grounds that the legislative history revealed no such
congressional intent. 79 The court stated that the effect of accepting appellant's contention would be to read into the Convention the equivalent
of " 'World-wide' service of process in all federal question, admiralty,
and diversity cases, while at the same time not authorizing nationwide
service of process for those same claims.""" The court's review of the Senate Executive Report"' showed that the testimony before the Senate
Committee consistently "emphasized that the treaty would not effect any
82
substantial changes in the operation of courts in the United States."
The court's finding that the Convention on Service Abroad did not provide the authorization for service of process on a foreign defendant as
required by Rule 4 meant that the service made on Hitachi pursuant to
the Convention was not by wholly federal means.8 3 Therefore, such authority could only come from the New Jersey long-arm statute, and reliance upon that statute precludes the application of the national contacts
test.
The appellate court's refusal to accept the Convention on Service
Abroad as authority for service of process on a foreign defendant finds
support in the legal press. One commentator 84 noted "[P]rocess served
outside the federal court's territory pursuant to a state rule, is valid only
if the state court would have had long-arm jurisdiction. '8 5 Thus the
Convention is viewed only as a means of improving service of process,
for a
not as an extension of jurisdictional authority. The continued need
86
state long-arm statute as a basis for jurisdiction is clearly seen.
Congressional action to allow nationwide service of process for admiralty claims would produce substantial benefits for plaintiffs suing
alien corporations. Had plaintiff De James secured jurisdiction over
Hitachi he would have enjoyed the strategic advantage of having both
those in control of the vessel and the "manufacturer" of the converted
portion of the ship in the same action. The potential for "fingerpointing" among the defendants would have been virtually eliminated: the
defendant or defendants in court could not sidestep liability by laying
79 Id. at 289.
80 Id.
81 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents, S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th. Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1967).
82 654 F.2d at 289.
83 Id. at 290.
84 See Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 Cornell Int'l L. J. 125 (1969).
85 Id. at 129 n. 16.
86 The court of appeals pointed out "[tihe anomaly of a federal court being limited by the

requirements of the fourteenth amendment in a nondiversity case where service must be made
pursuant to a state long-arm rule." 654 F.2d at 284. Normally, in a nondiversity case, a federal
court would be limited only by the due process restrictions the fifth amendment imposed on the
federal government, and not those which the fourteenth amendment imposes on the states. The
court suggested that congressional authorization of national service of process for admiralty
cases would "rectify" this anomaly. Id.

IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION

out a case against a defendant not at trial. Should the court find that
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries, it could impose liability on the
proper party without speculating as to the merits of possible defenses
which might be raised at a subsequent trial. Economically, one trial
reduces the burden plaintiff must bear to fully litigate his claim.
Further reductions in cost would occur if that one trial was held in
New Jersey because of the savings in travel time and expense. Plaintiff,
possible witnesses to the accident, and physical evidence or experts who
may have examined it are all likely to be in the New Jersey area. Plaintiff's employer and doctors who treated him after the accident are potential witnesses to damages and lost earnings sustained by the plaintiff and
are also likely to be within a convenient distance to a New Jersey court.
The cost of a trial requiring these parties to travel to a foreign country or
distant state could easily exceed the amount recoverable by the plaintiff.
As a matter of practicality, this would deprive him of means of redress
for his injury, a result far less likely to occur if all of a foreign corporation's contacts with the United States could be aggregated under a national contacts test.
Counterbalancing these benefits to potential plaintiffs are the burdens placed upon an alien corporation forced to defend itself in a distant
forum with which it has had little contact. However, as the Dejames
court 8 7 and others88 have recognized, multinational corporations headquartered abroad may be inconvenienced by a suit in the United States,
but the relative inconvenience of defending in one U.S. state is no greater
than defending a suit in another U.S. state. Where an alien corporation
has substantial relevant contacts with one state and few with the forum
state that has acquired jurisdiction through national contacts, a change
of venue may still be granted to transfer the case to a more convenient
forum. 89 This safeguard protects defendants from abuses in application
of the national contacts test. The scale is further tipped in favor of applying the national contacts test when one considers the interest of the
United States in providing its citizens with a necessary forum. 9°
The unrestricted use of the national contacts test, especially in diversity cases might require a foreign corporation to defend an action in a
state with which it deliberately maintained no contacts to avoid jurisdiction. It would be patently unfair to subject that defendant to whatever
state laws the forum might happen to have on its books. Admiralty law,
however, by its very nature, may be fairly applied to virtually any defendant involved in trade with the United States. Admiralty law has
87 491 F. Supp. at 1282.

88 Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.C., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663-64
(D.N.H. 1977); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 292 (D. Conn. 1975).

89 See supra note 64, at 359.
90 See McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), for a discussion of a state's "manifest interests." Such interests should likewise apply when the sovereign is
a nation and the "foreign forum" is another nation with a potentially different legal system.
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developed along "rather uniform lines in the several maritime nations, in
a very real sense a body of general maritime law has developed
internationally."'I
In Arroyo v. M/V Island Queen II' - the Federal District Court of Puerto Rico held that, "It is a fundamental principle of the maritime law of
the United States that it is to be uniform throughout the United
States." 3: This principle, combined with the grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to the federal court in Article III of the Constitution
and in the Judiciary Act,94 gives admiralty law many of the characteristics of a federally created right.
Under the holding of DeJanes, the plaintiff was left in the undesirable position of either bringing a separate suit against Hitachi or attempting to locate a more distant forum which has jurisdiction over all
defendants. His practical chances of recovery have been lessened and his
potential expenses multiplied. This failure of the United States to adequately provide its citizens with effective means of redress against an
alien corporation should be remedied. Consistent court interpretations
of "minimim contacts" as including more indirect benefits enjoyed by a
foreign defendant could eliminate the gap in the United States jurisdictional law. Alternatively, the use of a national contacts test for all federal
claims would allow jurisdiction where a foreign corporation clearly
would not be seriously inconvenienced by defending a suit in the United
States. Given the current trend to restrict long-arm jurisdiction, congressional action to provide for nationwide service of process in admiralty
suits and other federal claims may be required to eliminate the most unfair lapses of jurisdictional law, without tampering with the accepted
concepts of International Shoe.
-R.L.

91 2 C.J.S. Admiralty §3 (1972).
92 259 F. Supp. 15 (D.P.R. 1966).
93 Id. at 16.

94 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1976).
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